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FOREWORD 
The llASA Risk Group investigates the way in which societies , with their different 
cultural and institutional styles , make policy decisions on problems involving a risk to the 
health and safety of the population. An ongoing project* is concerned with the decisions 
in four countries - the Federal Republic of Germany , the Netherlands, the United King-
dom, and the United States - to site a liguefield energy-gas terminal on the coastline. 
This technology has a very low probability of an accident involving people living within 
its vicinity. It therefore presents a special challenge to political decision making with re-
spect to whether the facility should be built and, if so , where it should be located. The 
decision usually involves many interest groups , each of which is concerned with a number 
of attributes associated with the final decision , e.g., the provision of energy, the jobs 
created, and the risks to local residents . 
This article develops a descriptive model of siting procedures in the United States 
(California) that can aid the reader in understanding the complex , interactive process in 
which the siting decision is made. This work has been expanded to include each of the 
four countries in a report entitled Risk Analysis and Decision Processes: The Siting of 
LEG Facilities in Four Countries, which offers a comparative view of how societies cope 
with low-probability, high-consequence events. 
ALEC LEE 
Chairman 
Management and Technology Area 
*This project is funded by the Bundcsministcrium fiir Forschung und Technologie ( BMFT) of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 

A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF CHOICE FOR SITING 
FACILITIES1 
by Howard Kunreuther, John Lathrop,2 and Joanne Linnerooth 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria 
The siting of facilities for large-scale, novel technologies presents a formidable 
challenge to political risk management. This paper develops a model for describing the 
decision process for this type of problem at the level of societal systems. It explicitly 
considers the role of the relevant interested parties, each of whom brings to the siting 
debate its own set of objectives and attributes. We have labeled the approach a multiat-
tribute multiparty model (MAMP to distinguish it from prescriptive techniques such as 
multiattribute utility analysis or decision analysis). 
The MAMP model is a natural extension of the burgeoning literature on the key role 
that limited time, attention, and information processing capabilities play in political 
decision making when there are uncertain outcomes and likely conflicts among inter-
ested parties. The model also highlights the importance of decentralized and sequential 
decision making and indicates the role that formal risk assessments have played at each 
stage of the process. We illustrate its application in the context of the decision process 
associated with a proposed liquiefied natural gas terminal in California. The concluding 
portion of this paper suggests future research needs for improving the credibility of 
analysis and facilitating collective action with respect to facility siting problems. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
L ARGE-SCALE, novel technologies such as nuclear power or liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) promise to yield benefits to society, 
but only at the cost of potential cata-
strophic losses. Thus, the siting of the fa-
cilities for these technologies presents a 
formidable challenge to political risk man-
agement processes. There are two features 
of these problems which make them partic-
ularly difficult to structure analytically. 
First, unlike most private market transac-
tions, the selection of a site for these facil-
ities affects many different individuals and 
groups. People, regardless of personal pref-
erence, are exposed to the same risks which 
may produce conflicting views as to what 
alternatives are acceptable. Proposed LNG 
projects are thus examples of public goods. 
(For a more detailed description of the 
characteristics of public goods see Stokey 
& Zeckhauser, 1978, pp. 305-308.) 
1 This paper is printed with the permission of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
2361 Laxenburg, Austria. Views or opinions expressed 
in it do not necessarily reflect those of the National 
Member Organizations supporting the Institute or of 
the Institute itself. 
The research reported in this paper is supported by 
the Bundesministerium fuer Forschung and Technol-
ogie, F. R. G., contract no. 321/7591/ RGB 8001. While 
A second feature of the siting problem is 
the absence of a data base which provides 
conclusive statistical evidence on the likely 
performance of the new technology and the 
probability distribution associated with po-
tential accidents. Each of the interested 
parties may, thus, provide different esti-
mates of the chances and consequences of 
certain events. There are no objective mea-
sures to settle these differences. 
This paper describes a model of the de-
cision-making process for problems such as 
the siting of facilities based on new tech-
nologies. Different elements of society are 
affected by these projects and there are 
limited statistical data bases on the associ-
ated risks. The model considers the role of 
the many interested parties and their spe-
cific concerns. It emphasizes the potential 
for conflict emerging among the interested 
parties as a result of their differing objec-
tives, mandates, and information sources. 
support for this work is gratefully acknowledged, the 
views expressed are the authors' own and are not 
necessarily shared by the sponsor. We greatly bene-
fited from earlier discussions with Nino Majone and 
Chris Mandi, Louis Miller, Michael Stoto, and Detlof 
von Winterfeldt for their helpful comments on a pre-
liminary draft of this paper. 
' Dr. Lathrop is now at Woodward-Clyde Consult-
ants, San Francisco. 
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We have labeled it a multiattribute multi-
party (MAMP) approach to distinguish it 
from the prescriptive techniques developed 
in the literature such as multiattribute util-
ity models or decision analysis. 
The MAMP model serves two principal 
purposes. A central focus of a IIASA re-
search project is an analysis of the siting 
decision concerning liquefied natural gas 
terminals in four countries (the Federal Re-
public of Germany, the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, and the United States). A 
discussion of the factors influencing the 
siting process in different countries appears 
in Kunreuther, Linnerooth, and Starnes (in 
press). The MAMP model has enabled us to 
standardize our presentation. In a more 
general sense, it may be a useful tool for 
undertaking comparative analyses across 
cultures and across problems. 
Secondly, the MAMP model is a natural 
extension of the burgeoning literature in 
the social sciences on the key role that 
limited time, attention, and information 
processing capabilities play in political de-
cision making where there are uncertain 
outcomes and likely conflicts among inter-
ested parties. It, thus, reflects the impor-
tance of understanding decision processes 
as a first step in trying to improve the way 
society copes with these types of public 
goods. 
We illustrate the application of MAMP in 
the context of one of our four case studies-
the siting of an LNG terminal in California. 
A brief description of the nature of the 
problem provides a perspective on this case. 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a potential 
source of energy which requires a fairly 
complicated technological process that has 
the potential, albeit with very low proba-
bility, of creating severe losses. For pur-
poses of transporting, natural gas can be 
converted to liquid form at about 1/600 its 
gaseous volume. It is shipped in specially 
constructed tankers and received at a ter-
minal where it undergoes regasification and 
is then distributed. The entire system (i.e., 
the liquefaction facility, the LNG tankers, 
the receiving terminal, and regasification 
facility) can cost more than $1 billion to 
construct (Office of Technology Assess-
ment, 1977) . In 1974, three LNG terminals 
were proposed for California. After seven 
years of negotiations, hearings, and studies, 
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on three levels of government, there is still 
no approved site for any of the proposed 
terminals in California. (A more detailed 
discussion of the California siting process 
appears in Kunreuther & Lathrop, in press; 
Lathrop, 1981; Linnerooth, 1980.) 
The paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion II we briefly specify the conceptual 
foundations of the MAM.P model. Section III 
provides a more formal structural building 
on concepts first proposed by Braybrooke 
(1974). In section IV we show how the 
decision process for LNG siting in California 
can be examined through the use of the 
model. Section V suggests ways that the 
MAMP model can help to understand better 
the societal decision-making process. The 
concluding section suggests future research 
needs for improving the process. 
II. RELEVANT CONCEPTS 
Bounded rationality 
The theoretical and empirical literature 
on decision processes in organization theory 
and political science form the basis for the 
development of the MAMP model. We re-
view some of the important concepts below. 
There is a growing recognition in the polit-
ical science literature that decision makers 
are limited in their ability and desire to 
collect information on which to base their 
actions. They thus attempt to satisfice 
rather than optimize. One of the earliest 
descriptions of this bounded rational be-
havior in the context of societal decision 
making is by Lindblom (1959) where he 
contends that the political process is one of 
incremental muddling rather than compre-
hensive choice. Instead of examining the 
full range of alternatives available, govern-
ment agencies or politicians focus only on 
a limited set of options. They proceed in-
crementally by comparing the results of 
each new policy with old ones, thus drasti-
cally simplifying the decision-making proc-
ess from the one implied by the classical 
rational model of choice (Braybrooke & 
Lindblom, 1963). 
Implicit in the concept of incremental 
decision making is the assumption that in-
dividuals and interested parties have a very 
limited amount of time available to deal 
with any particular problem. An excellent 
illustration of this feature of political deci-
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sion making is Wildavsky's (1964) analysis 
of the us budgetary process. Due to the 
complex structure and myriad sets of fig-
ures in the budget it is necessary for officials 
to employ simplified tools in making their 
choices. One of the principal ways budget 
officials justify their actions is to use last 
year's budget as a guide. In fact, Wildavsky 
points out that: 
Budgeting is incremental, not compre-
hensive . . . . Thus, the men who make 
the budget are concerned with relatively 
small increments to an existing base. 
Their attention is focused on a small 
number of items over which the budget-
ary battle is fought. (p. 15) 
Multiple parties and multiple issues 
The literature in both organization the-
ory and political science provides an impor-
tant perspective on the societal decision-
making process by stressing the role of mul-
tiple parties, each of whom have their own 
goals and objectives. For example, March 
and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March 
(1963) view the organization as a coalition 
of parties, each of which imposes different 
demands on the system. The goals of the 
firm arise through a process of bargaining 
among potential coalition members. In a 
similar vein, Neustadt (1970), in his later 
reflections on presidential power, points out 
that each of the interested parties in the 
government has its own interests and sep-
arate responsibilities. Policy emerges as a 
result of political bargaining among the ac-
tors. 
One of the finest studies illustrating the 
importance of multiple parties in the deci-
sion-making process is Allison's (1971) anal-
ysis of the Cuban missile crisis. Of the three 
models he develops to explain the way pol-
icy is made, his Government Politics Model 
(Model Ill) comes closest to our view of the 
societal decision-making process. Allison 
points out that in decision-making situa-
tions there are many actors who are in the 
game as players. Each of them focuses on 
multiple problems rather than a single issue 
and have a set of national, organizational, 
and personal goals. The parties share power 
and have conflicting preferences. In order 
to determine how a particular decision 
emerges, it is necessary to identify the var-
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ious issues which are deemed important, to 
indicate what bargains and compromises 
emerged, and to "convey some feel for the 
confusion" (p. 146). 
Conflicts and agendas 
If there are competing parties in the so-
cietal decision-making game, then there are 
likely to be emerging conflicts. One of the 
important questions which has been stud-
ied in recent years is how these potential 
conflicts are handled. Cyert and March 
(1963) hypothesize that conflict is rarely 
resolved in an organization, but that se-
quential and decentralized decision making 
enable actions to be taken in many situa-
tions even if there are inconsistent goals 
between the parties. The importance of 
these features of the organizational deci-
sion-making process in the context of polit-
ical decision making is highlighted by the 
following quote from Simon (1967): 
Influence over the direction of attention 
of the political organs is a principal 
means for affecting action. The notion of 
power as a tug-of-war between alterna-
tives yields to a notion of power as influ-
ence on a sequential process in which 
actions must be generated as well as cho-
sen and in which attention is a scarce 
resource (p. 108). 
This characterization of the decision 
process is similar to the one formulated by 
Allison, who suggests that each one of the 
parties in the game faces an agenda with 
hundreds of deadlines, not all of which are 
being met. There is, thus, a need for some 
type of prioritization among items. In other 
words one needs to consider the nature of 
the agenda-setting process. As one would 
expect, these items which are placed on the 
legislative agenda become an important de-
terminant of the final decisions which will 
be taken by society. 
Cobb and Elder (1972) indicate that an 
important way that an issue gets placed on 
the agenda is through some type of exoge-
nous event which creates conflict. They 
illustrate this phenomenon using the ex-
ample of the passage of the Federal Coal 
Mine and Safety Act of 1969, designed to 
reduce deaths from mine accidents and pro-
tect miners from black lung disease. The 
legislation was triggered initially by a cave-
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in of a West Virginia coal mine which 
trapped and eventually killed 78 miners. 
This disaster caused the miners to strike, 
which brought pressure on the state and · 
federal government to react to the miners' 
concerns. 
In another context, Holling (1981) has 
pointed out how specific crises in the short-
run can lead to changes in policies with 
respect to environmental and ecological 
problems (e.g., the suppression of the 
spruce budworm after it had destroyed for-
ests in Canada). Kunreuther and Lathrop 
(in press) describe with specific examples 
how exogenous events triggered new coali-
tions and new legislation regarding LNG sit-
ing decision in the United States. 
One reason for the importance of exoge-
nous events, such as crises and disasters, in 
triggering societal interest in a specific 
problem is that it is easily understood evi-
dence of trouble. Walker (1977) stresses the 
importance of this factor in setting the dis-
cretionary agenda of the us Congress or a 
government agency. To support this point, 
Walker presents empirical evidence on the 
passage of safety legislation in the United 
States. 
Sequential processing of issues 
Braybrooke (1974, 1978) has developed 
an interesting concept of the political sys-
tem which he views "as a machine or col-
lection of machines for processing issues." 
In contrast to the static theory of collective 
choice based on the pioneering work of 
Arrow (1963), Braybrooke views the deci-
sion-making process as sequential and con-
stantly changing. At any point in time there 
is an issue or set of issues which involve a 
set of interested parties. Over time partic-
ular issues may be resolved, disappear, or 
be transformed as new information or new 
alternatives emerge. In particular, new pro-
posals may be constructed to reflect either 
the changes in preferences of the interested 
parties and/or a revised set of societal val-
ues. 
The importance of Braybrooke's work is 
that it enables one to decompose a problem 
into smaller subproblems by focusing on 
relevant issues. It, thus, captures the se-
quential decision-making process which 
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characterizes individual and organizational 
problem solving (March, 1978) as well as 
the public policy-making process (Ger-
shuny, 1981) . 
The setting of an agenda is likely to play 
a role in determining the final outcome 
emerging from this sequential decision 
process. Empirical evidence from the field 
as well as from laboratory experiments 
(Levine & Plott, 1977) indicates that the 
order in which specific subproblems are 
considered frequently leads to different out-
comes for the same broader question. 
We expect the same order effect for so-
cietal decision-making problems for two 
principal reasons. Once a particular deci-
sion has been made on a particular issue, 
this serves as a constraint for the next set 
of issues. If the order of the issues is re-
versed, then there is likely to be a different 
set of choices to consider. Second, each 
issue involves a different set of interested 
parties who bring with them their own set 
of data to bolster their cause. The timing of 
the release of this information may have an 
effect on later actions. For example, citizen 
groups normally enter the scene with re-
spect to siting problems only when their 
own community is being considered as a 
possible candidate. The order in which dif-
ferent locations are considered is, thus, 
likely to influence the final outcome of the 
siting debate. 
Summary 
In summary there is a large body of lit-
erature which has emerged in recent years 
suggesting that the societal decision-mak-
ing process is one where there are a number 
of interested parties who have their own 
goals and objectives. Each actor has his 
own set of information which he uses to 
defend specific recommendations. As a way 
of reducing potential conflicts, the decision-
making process is frequently sequential and 
decentralized, since many items are com-
peting for limited time and attention. The 
process of agenda building is an important 
element in understanding why certain prob-
lems are considered important and others 
are ignored. Recent empirical studies have 
stressed the importance of exogenous 
events as an important variable in explain-
ing this process. Political decision making 
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is likely to follow a sequential process 
whereby new issues emerge through the 
resolution of previous issues, changes in 
party preferences, and/or social norms. 
III. STRUCTURE OF THE MAMP MODEL 
The above concepts are now incorpo-
rated into a model of a sequential decision 
process which involves different interested 
parties at each stage. The model views po-
litical decision making in terms of the con-
cepts discussed in the previous section. It 
should be viewed as a first step in charac-
terizing societal decision making with lim-
ited information. 
Rounds. The decision process can be 
separated into different rounds which label 
by capital letters A, B, ... A round is simply 
a convenient device to illustrate a change 
in the focus of discussions. This new focus 
or direction can be triggered by (1) a key 
decision taken (or a stalemate reached due 
to conflicts among parties), or (2) a change 
in the context of the discussions due to an 
unanticipated event, the entrance of a new 
party or new evidence brought to the de-
bate. Although we will treat rounds as se-
quential in our illustrative case study, they 
may also be overlapping. 
Problem formulation. The decision 
process in each round is characterized by a 
unique problem formulation phase. The al-
ternatives for discussion are bounded by 
specific constraints. These include legisla-
tive and legal mandates requiring specific 
parties to be part of the debate, resource 
constraints which have the effect oflimiting 
certain parties from exerting an influence 
because they do not have adequate funds 
and means, and prespecified voting proce-
dures indicating what parties have the 
power to influence the outcome of specific 
decisions and in what ways. The previous 
decisions already taken will also influence 
the way the problem is formulated. In this 
sense the agenda-setting process will have 
an impact on final outcomes. 
A round of discussions is initiated by a 
formal or informal request. Informal dis-
cussions may be initiated simply by such 
actions as a request for information on the 
part of one of the parties or a request for 
preliminary discussions. Because the par-
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ticular form of these initiating requests may 
further define or limit the bounds of the 
discussion, the careful scrutiny of their 
wording is important. For example, it may 
make a difference in the decision process if 
the question is framed as "which site, if 
any, is appropriate?", or "whether one of 
the proposed sites x, y, and z is appropri-
ate?" Belnap and Steel (1976) refer to the 
first question as a "which question" and the 
second as a "whether" question. Whether 
questions demand more complicated con-
siderations and detailed thinking while 
which questions can be approached with 
simpler rules of thumb and heuristics. 
Alternatives, attributes, and deci-
sions. No matter how a round is initiated 
it is characterized by a unique problem 
formulation which is presented in the form 
of a limited set of alternatives due to infor-
mation processes, limitations, and the con-
straints affecting the interested parties. 
We define the alternatives for round A to 
be A 1, A2, A 3, • • • ; round B has alternatives 
B 1, B 2, B3 ••• • There can be several deci-
sions made in any round, but by definition 
they are based on the same set of alterna-
tives. In other words, if the set of alterna-
tives change, we will treat this as a new 
round. (Two rounds, however, can utilize 
the same alternatives. The difference be-
tween the rounds may be due to a revised 
problem formulation, e.g., new legislation 
or constraints.) Each alternative is charac-
terized by a set of attributes Xi ..... Yi". 
The value of any attribute can change from 
round to round on the basis of new infor-
mation or perceptual changes. For certain 
attributes any party involved may have 
target or aspiration levels which determine 
whether he considers a particular alterna-
tive in round A to be acceptable with re-
spect to attribute X ;. 
Another important feature of the deci-
sion process is that the value of an attribute 
to the same interested party can change 
over time because of new information. For 
example, if a report provides new insight 
into the seismic risk associated with a par-
ticular site, this may cause a change in the 
perception of this attribute by one or more 
of the parties involved. That change may 
take the form of a different estimate of the 
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level of the attribute for that site, or per-
haps a different weight given to the relative 
importance for the attribute. 
Interaction phase. To understand a 
particular pattern of institutional choice it 
is necessary to analyze a set of policy actors 
{P}, their respective power positions, their 
interactions with one another at different 
stages of the process, and the information 
available to them. We define Pk to be the 
kth interested party in the debate. Its eval-
uation of alternative A 1 is based on its 
estimation of the levels and values of each 
attribute resulting from that option, and 
the relative importance given to each attri-
bute. Another party might have different 
estimates of the effects of an option, differ-
ent costs and benefits resulting from those 
effects, or assign different relative impor-
tance to each of the attributes. Because of 
any of these differences one party may rank 
alternatives differently than another. As we 
shall see in our analysis of the California 
case this happened frequently. Thus, in the 
case of two interested parties and two al-
ternatives it is possible that party 1 prefers 
A 1 to A 2, while party 2 has the reverse 
reaction. 
The interaction among the parties is rep-
resented by the main arguments each 
brings to the debate in support of or in 
rejection of each of the alternatives at hand. 
Those arguments may relate to only one or 
two attributes. It is not suggested here that 
the arguments presented for or against a 
particular proposal necessarily reflect a 
concern of the party making the argument. 
For example, a party opposed to a site 
because of its concern for environmental 
quality may present an argument using 
seismic risk as the main reason to reject the 
site. The argument attribute may be se-
lected to maximize the effectiveness of the 
argument, not to reflect the actual concern 
of the party. The argument reflects a strat-
egy on the part of the actor in support of or 
opposition to the proposal. The strategy of 
the actors can reveal a number of underly-
ing motives and desires of those concerned 
and may be essential in understanding the 
interpretation and use of scientific evi-
dence, including risk analyses. 
The interaction phase provides useful in-
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sights into the process. Parties often come 
into the debate with firm preferences. The 
interaction phase brings out their argu-
ments, i.e., attributes and perceptions, and 
may change their positions on an issue. The 
stability of the system can, at least par-
tially, be judged by the degree to which the 
actors-people holding certain recognized 
positions (i.e., officials, experts, group lead-
ers) or collections of these people, whether 
formally organized institutions or loosely 
working alliances-remain the same after 
each successive round. 
The outcome of the political debate re-
sults, to a large extent, from some combi-
nation of the political power on the part of 
the parties involved, the attention they give 
to the issues in light of their limited re-
sources and time, the way in which the 
problems on the political agenda are 
framed, and the exogenous events that may 
change the problem and/or the parties. The 
interaction phase can be thought of as the 
formal and informal communication among 
the parties influencing the decision out-
come. Wynne (1981) has shown the futility 
of assuming that parties interact as 
"rational" actors in the sense of actively 
and openly pursuing clearly defined objec-
tives, but that defensive behavior, that is, 
the avoidance of problems and dangers, 
may be no less rational than goal-directed 
behavior. 
In addition, Majone (1979) points out 
that organizational behavior is usually not 
directed at problem solving in any rational 
sense, but rather at serving the longer-run 
interests of the organization or institution. 
In the public domain, as opposed to the 
market, decisions must be justified with 
seemingly objective arguments, and a con-
sensus within and/or beyond an organiza-
tion can only be reached with convincing 
and institutionally appropriate arguments. 
Therefore, the arguments made by the par-
ties, though they cannot be interpreted as 
representing clearly defined goals, are im-
portant insofar as they reveal the complex 
strategies and counter strategies of those in 
the policy game. 
Concluding a round. The round is con-
cluded by a decision, a stalemate, a change 
in information (changing the focus of the 
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Argument 1 
Defend 
Preference 
with 
Attributes 
Standard 
Procedures 
Argument 2: 
Defend 
Preference 
with 
Attributes 
Decision Taken or "Non-Decision" Outcome ...-ls_P_ro_c-es~s-C-lo-se_d_? ~~~-0-0--__J 
FIG. 1. Multiattribute multiparty (MAMP) model of 
choice. 
debate and, hence, initiating a new round), 
or an exogenous event (e.g., a disaster) 
aborting the discussions and requiring a 
new round of inquiry. Each decision can, in 
turn, be described by the tradeoffs implicit 
in the choice made. These tradeoffs may 
not be explicitly recognized by the decision 
maker, or not explicitly analyzed in the 
process of making the decision. 
Fig. 1 provides a schematic diagram of 
the MAMP model. In the problem formula-
tion phase of each round certain constraints 
circumscribe the issues. An initiating event 
determines the limited set of alternatives 
{ J1, J2 ... } which, in turn, induce a set of 
interested parties {Pk} to enter the scene. 
Each of these parties has its own prefer-
ences for a given set of alternatives; these 
preferences are defended by a set of attri-
butes. The interaction process results either 
in a clear decision or an outcome that does 
not have the appearance of a decision but 
that does conclude the round. 
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The conclusion of round J can take one 
of two forms. If there is a feasible and 
agreed-upon solution or if no solution is 
possible, the process ends. However, if one 
or more parties is unsatisfied with the sit-
uation at the end of the round, and has 
recourse to other channels, or if the round 
ends in a request for further action, a new 
problem is formulated for round J + 1 and 
the above sequence is repeated for another 
set of alternatives, interested parties (some 
or all may be the same as in J), etc. 
IV. APPL YING MAMP: THE SITING OF THE 
CALIFORNIA LNG TERMINAL 
In this section we will apply the MAMP 
framework to the question of whether Cal-
ifornia should have an LNG terminal. We 
will first specify the relevant interested par-
ties, and then focus on the actual decision 
process. 
Interested parties and relevant 
attributes 
To structure the siting process we need 
to have a good understanding of the differ-
ent concerns of the interested parties. For 
the LNG problem there are three categories 
of concern which are relevant: risk aspects, 
economic aspects, and environmental as-
pects. Each of these concerns can be de-
scribed by a set of attributes. Table 1 de-
picts an interested party I attribute matrix 
showing the main concerns of each of the 
relevant groups over this seven-year period. 
The attributes listed have been selected 
to reflect the nature of debates in the proc-
ess, that is, to reflect the attributes as per-
ceived by the parties in the 'debate, rather 
than to characterize in some logical analyt-
ical manner the alternatives. For example, 
population risk (X2) involves the risk to life 
and limb to neighbors of the LNG terminal 
due to accidents, including those induced 
by earthquakes. Earthquake risk (Xa), 
which involves both population risk and 
supply interruption risk due to earth-
quakes, is included as a separate attribute 
since it was handled as such in the process. 
The filled cells in Table 1 indicate which 
parties pay particular attention to which 
attributes. Naturally, many of the parties 
care about all the attributes listed. How-
ever, either because of the incentives di-
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TABLE I 
PRINCIPAL PARTY- BY-ATTRIBUTE MATRIX FOR LNG SITING JN CALIFORNIA. 
Att r ibutes 
Risk 
su pp ly interruption x , 
population x, 
eart hquake x, 
E nvironmenta l 
a ir qu ali ty x, 
land use X e. 
E<:onomic 
profi t considerations x. 
price of gas x, 
loca l economic benefi ts x, 
Applicant 
Utili ties 
p , 
• 
• 
Federal 
f' ERC 
p , 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
CCC 
P ,, 
• 
• 
• 
Principal Parties• 
Government 
State 
CPUC 
P, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Legislature 
P ·. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Local 
M unici pal 
Govern-
ment 
P , 
• 
• 
• 
Interest Groups 
Sierra 
Club 
p , 
• 
• 
• 
Local 
Citizens 
p , 
• 
• 
• Key to party acronyms and abbrevia tions: n mc: Federal Energy Regu latory Commission, or, in the first two rounds of the process, its preceding 
agern:y, the 1' cdera l Power Commission; ccc: Ca lifo rnia Coastal Commission; CPUC: California Public Utilit ies Commission: Legislature: Califo rnia 
State Legislatu re. 
rectly felt by the party or because of the 
role the party plays in society, each party 
makes its decisions as a function primarily 
of a particular subset of the attributes. 
The applicant, Western LNG Terminal 
Associates, was a special company set up to 
represent the LNG-siting interests of three 
gas distribution utilities: Southern Califor-
nia Gas Company, Pacific Gas and Electric, 
and El Paso Natural Gas Company. As 
domestic gas supplies seemed to be dimin-
ishing in the late 1960s, the gas utilities 
perceived an increased risk of supply inter-
ruption, which could be mitigated by addi-
tional supplies such as LNG. Quite naturally, 
the applicant was primarily concerned with 
profitability (X6 ) and secure supplies of gas 
(X1). 
At the various government levels there 
are five principal parties. The Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the 
Department of Energy is the principal body 
at the federal level which determines 
whether a proposed LNG project is in the 
public interest and should be allowed. In 
making its judgment it considers primarily 
the following attributes: risk factors (Xi, X2, 
and X3) , environmental guidelines as re-
flected in air quality (X4) and use of land 
(Xs) and the expected LNG price (X1). 
Let us turn now to state agencies which 
play a role. The California Coastal Com-
mission (ccc) was created in 1976, and has 
the responsibility for the protection of the 
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California coastline. Its primary concerns 
with respect to LNG are with the use of land 
(Xs) and the associated risks (X2 and Xa) 
from building a terminal at a specific site. 
The California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) is the principal state body involved 
in power plant issues and is primarily con-
cerned with the rate-setting process. Hence, 
the CPUC focused on the provision of energy 
to California residents and need for gas (X1) 
and the proposed price of the product (X1) . 
In addition, it has responsibility for evalu-
ating the impact that a proposed facility 
would have on the environment and safety. 
The California State Legislature is ulti-
mately responsible for the outcome of any 
siting process. It determines which state 
and local agencies have final authority to 
rule on the feasibility of a proposed site. In 
addition, it can set standards to constrain 
any siting process. Hence, the concerns of 
the legislators range over economic, envi-
ronmental, and safety attributes as shown 
in Table 1. 
At the local level, the city councils eval-
uate the benefits of a proposed terminal in 
their jurisdiction in terms of the tax, busi-
ness revenues, and jobs (Xs) it promises to 
provide. The councils try to balance this 
positive feature with the impact that the 
facility would have on land use (Xs) and 
risk to the population (X2). Finally, the 
public interest groups, represented by the 
Sierra Club and local citizens groups, are 
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primarily concerned with environmental 
and safety issues. The important message 
of Table 1 does not lie in the details of 
exactly which cells are filled, but lies in the 
generally great differences between col-
umns of the table. That is, the different 
parties in the process care about very dif-
ferent subsets of the attributes. 
The decision process 
The siting process in California (which is 
not yet terminated) can be characterized 
by four rounds of discussions as shown in 
Table 2, which provides a summary of the 
entire process. Each round, in turn, con-
tains a summary of how the problem was 
defined, the initiating event, and how the 
discussions were concluded. The remainder 
of this subsection discusses in more detail 
the decision process within each of the 
rounds. The main elements of rounds A, B, 
C, and D are described in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 
6, respectively. 
Round A began in September 1974, when 
the applicant filed for approval of three 
sites on the California Coast-Point Con-
ception, Oxnard, .. and Los Angeles-to re-
ceive gas from Indonesia. The application 
raised two central questions which defined 
the problem addressed in round A: Does 
California need LNG, and if so, which, if any, 
of the proposed sites is appropriate? 
The agenda for discussion was more nar-
rowly defined at this stage. The wheels of 
the process were set into motion, not by a 
broadbased energy-policy question initi-
ated in Washington, but by a proposal from 
industry for three preselected sites. The 
importance of this process-where the ini-
tiative is taken first by industry-in prese-
lecting the agenda for debate cannot be 
overemphasized. The initiating proposal 
framed the problem as "Should the pro-
posed LNG sites be approved?, and not 
"Should California have an LNG terminal in 
view of the alternatives, costs, risks, etc.?" 
Setting the agenda in this manner did not 
preclude the "need" question from entering 
the debate, but it did ensure that the ques-
tion was only considered in the context of 
a siting application. 
Table 3 also specifies the relevant inter-
ested parties who were involved in the in-
teraction phase of round A. Those parties 
which had formal decision power are 
marked with an asterisk. There were four 
primary attributes which were utilized in 
the ensuing debate among the parties. The 
need for LNG or the risk of an interruption 
in the supply of natural gas (X1) supported 
TABLE 2 
Round A 
Problem Formu lation: 
Initiating Event: 
Conclusion: 
Hound H 
l'rohlem Formulation: 
Initiating Event: 
Conclusion: 
Round C 
Problem Formulation: 
Initiating Event: 
Conclusion: 
Kound I) 
Problem Formulation: 
Initiating Event.: 
Conclusion: 
SUMMARY OF ROUNDS IN CALIFORNIA LNG SITING CASE. 
Should the proposed sites be approved? That is: Does California need LNG, and if so, which, if any, 
of the proposed sites is appropriate? 
Applicant files for approval of three sites. 
Applicant perceives that no site is approvable without long delay. 
How should need for LNG be determined? If need is established. how should an LNG facility be sited? 
Applicant and others put pressure on State Legislature to facilitate LNG siting. 
Date 
September 1974 
(34 months) 
.July 1977 
July 1977 
(2 months) 
A new siting process is set up that essentially as.o;;umes a need for LNG, and is designed to accelerate September 1977 
LNG terminal sit ing. 
Which site should be approved? 
Applicant files for approval of Point Concept ion site. 
Site is approved condit ional on consideration of additional seismic risk data. 
ls Point Conception seismically safe? 
Regulatory agencies set up procedures to consider additional seismic risk data. 
{Round is still in progress.) 
October 1977 
(10 months) 
,July 1978 
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TABLE 3 
E:.EM E N TS OF ROUND A. 
Problem For"tlulation: Should the proposed. sites be approved? 
That is: Does California need LNG, and if so, 
which , if any, of the proposed sites is appro-
priate? 
Initiating Event: Applicant files for approval of three sites. 
Alternatives: Site at Point Conception: ~A 1 
Site at Oxnard: A 2 
Site at Los Angeles: A 1 
Site at any combination of: A 1, A 1 , A:1 
Interaction: 
Involved Parties Attributes Used as Arguments 
Applicant P, x, 
• f'E RC p, x, x, 
•ccc p, x, 
•City Councils p, x, x •. 
Sierra Club p, x, x, 
Local Citizens p, x, x, 
Key Decisions: 
1. ccc concerns over population risk implies t hat A' is preferred over 
the other two sites. 
2. FERC would not approve A 1 because the seismic risk is greater than 
a prescribed acceptable level. 
Conclusion: 
Applicant perceives a stalemate, i.e., that no site is approvable without 
long delay. 
• Interested party with responsibility for decision(s). 
the locating of a terminal in at least one of 
the three proposed sites. While environ-
mental, land-use considerations (Xs) sug-
gested a nonremote site (Los Angeles and 
Oxnard), the risks to the population (X2) 
argued for siting the terminal in a remote 
area (Point Conception) . Finally, concerns 
about earthquake risk brought about op-
position to the Los Angeles site, which was 
found to be crossed by a significant fault. 
The interaction phase of round A (see 
Table 3) indicates the attributes used as 
arguments by each of the major involved 
parties. It is important to distinguish the 
listing of attributes from that in Table 1. 
While Table 1 specifies which attributes are 
of primary concern to each party, Table 3 
specifies which attributes were used as ar-
guments by each party. Thus, while the 
applicant is concerned with both profit con-
siderations and supply interruption risk, its 
arguments in support of each site stressed 
supply interruption risk. 
Two key decisions were made during 
round A. First, the ccc, concerned about 
the catastrophic potential of LNG, implied 
that they were likely to favor Point Con-
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ception over the nonremote sites due to 
concerns over population risk. Specifically, 
the ccc advised Western to pursue at least 
one site in a remote area since they would 
deny approval to any nonremote site which 
was not considered safe. Second, the FERC 
indicated disapproval of the Port of Los 
Angeles as an acceptable site because a 
recently discovered earthquake fault in-
creased the seismic risk above a prescribed 
acceptable level. 
The round was concluded with a possible 
stalemate, at least as perceived by industry 
(Ahern, 1980). Los Angles would not receive 
federal (FERC) approval, Oxnard might not 
receive state (ccc) approval, and Point 
Conception would face difficult approval 
challenges at the county and state (ccc) 
levels because of its adverse land-use im-
pacts. 
The stalemates of round A formulated 
the problem for round B . It was clear to all 
the parties involved that it was difficult, if 
not impossible, for the applicant to gain 
approval for a site under the existing siting 
procedure in California. In particular, there 
were possibilities of vetoing proposals at 
either the federal, state, or local levels as 
evidenced by the respective reactions to the 
three proposed sites. Rather than trying to 
operate within the existing constraint.s of 
the process, the interested parties in the 
process frequently try to change the rules 
of the game (Majone, 1979). 
This behavior relates to the process de-
scribed by Braybrooke (1978), where he 
points out that issues are frequently trans-
formed over time. Round B is a good illus-
tration of this process. The problem was 
redefined into two new questions: How 
should need for LNG be determined? If need 
is established, how should an LNG facility 
be sited? The round was thus initiated 
when pressure to change the siting proce-
dure was brought to the State Legislature 
by the ut ility companies, the business com-
munity, and the labor unions in California. 
Table 4 depicts the relevant alternatives 
which formed the basis for the debate on 
the elements of proposed legislation. 
The industry and business interests saw 
the inevitable problem of obtaining local 
approval for a project in the national inter-
est, but with costs to the local community. 
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TABLE 4 
ELEMENTS OF ROUND B. 
Problem Formulation: 
Initiating Event: 
Alternatives: 
Interaction: 
Involved Parties 
Applicant P1 
CCC P1 
CPUC p4 
•• State Legislature P-, 
Key Deci<;ions: 
How should need for LNG be determined? If 
need is established, how should an LNG facil-
ity be sited? 
Applicant and others put pressure on state 
legislature to facilitate LNG siting. 
Consider offshore sites: B' 
Consider remote onshore sites: 8 1 
Consider nonremote onshore sites: 8 1 
One-stop licensing: B• 
Licensing Agency: CPUC ... B·'', CCC - 8 6, CEC 
- B'" 
Any consistent combination of 8 1 through 
B'. 
Attributes Used for Arguments 
x, 
x, 
x, 
x, 
x, 
3. Initial legislation introduced which included 8 1, 8 1 , and B ~. 
4. Final legislation passed which incorporated 8 2 , B~. and B·\. 
Conclusion: 
Passage of LNG Siting Act of 1977 (S.B. 1081) which defines a custom-
tailored s it ing procedure for LNG. Some features: 
-ccc nominates and ranks sites in addition to the one applied for 
- CPUC selects a site from the ccc-ranked set, not necessa rily the 
top-ranked site. 
• CEC = California Energy Comission. 
• • Interested party with responsibility for decision(s) . 
So the utility companies battled for a bill 
(S.B.1081) which would vest the CPUC with 
one-stop licensing authority, precluding 
any interference from local communities. 
The environmental and local interests, on 
the other hand, objected to a one-stop li-
censing process and favored a bill which 
required remote siting. 
The resulting legislation was a compro-
mise between the environmentalists, who 
supported consideration of off-shore sites, 
and those who saw an urgent need for an 
LNG facility to assure energy and jobs. The 
CPUC was chosen over the more conserva-
tion-minded ccc or the California Energy 
Commission as the agency with state per-
mit authority, preempting local govern-
ments. As a bow to the conservationists, 
the ccc was given the mandate to choose 
and to rank possible sites, and to pass these 
ranking on to the CPUC. It was agreed that 
the site would not be offshore, as some 
environmentalists wished, nor could it be in 
a populated area, as the gas utilities wished. 
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Indeed, a nonpopulated area was strictly 
defined. There could be no more than an 
average of 10 people per square mile within 
one mile of the terminal, and no more than 
60 people per square mile within four miles 
of the terminal. 
The passage of the Siting Act of 1977 
(S.B.1081) opened up a new procedure for 
finding an acceptable site and led to round 
C with the following problem formulation. 
Which site should be approved? The round 
was initiated by the ccc which, after con-
sidering 82 sites meeting the remote-siting 
constraint, ranked the top four sites, Camp 
Pendleton, Rattlesnake Canyon, Point 
Conception, and Deer Canyon, in that or-
der, on the basis of seismic, soil, wind and 
wave conditions, rough cost, and coastal 
resource considerations. (Point Conception 
was included in the candidate set because 
S. 1081 required that the applied-for site be 
included.) 
These four alternatives form the back-
ground for the interaction among the inter-
ested parties in round C as shown in Table 
5. The ccc passed these rankings on to the 
TABLE 5 
ELEMENTS OF ROUND C. 
Problem Formulation: Which site should be approved? 
Initiating Event: 
Applicant files for approval of Point Concep-
tion site. (The only site of the original three 
meeting the remote siting constraint of S.B. 
1081.) 
Alternatives: (Sites nominated by ccc plus applied-for 
Interaction: 
site.) 
Site at Camp Pendleton: C 1 
Site at Rattlesnake C anyon C1 
Site at Point Conception: C1 
S ite at Deer Canyon : c• 
Involved Parties Attributes Used for Arguments 
Applicant P 1 x, 
f''ERC P2 x, x, 
CCC P1 x, 
CPUC P. x, x, 
S ierra Club P7 x, x .. 
Local Citizens P~ x, 
Key Decisions: 
5. The CCC has the following preference: C 1 > C 2 > C 1 > C4 
6. The CPUC approved conditional on whether or not the seismic risk 
is acceptable. 
"i . The FERC t::onsider C ' a.c<.·eptahle. 
8. Court requires FERC co consider additional data t.o determine 
whether or nol seismic risk at C 1 is acceptable. 
Conclusion: 
FERC and CPUC to consirler add itional sei.<;mic data. 
• lmerest.ed party with responsibilit y for deci.sion{s). 
292 KUNREUTHER, LATHROP, AND LINNEROOTH 
CPUC which chose, by process of elimina-
tion, Point Conception, on the grounds that 
the two higher-ranked sites would involve 
unacceptable delay and would cause unac-
ceptable risk to transients (i.e., campers, 
swimmers, etc.) at the nearby beaches and 
public parks. The CPUC, however, could 
only conditionally approve Point Concep-
tion subject to the utility company's ability 
to show that earthquake faults discovered 
in the area presented an acceptable risk to 
the terminal. 
At the federal level, the FERC staff deter-
mined that the risks of both Oxnard and 
Point Conception were acceptably low, so 
that Oxnard should be preferred on land-
use grounds; however, the FERC, choosing 
to avoid a federal-state confrontation, ruled 
in favor of Point Conception. After an ap-
peal by the environmental and local inter-
ests, the Washington, D.C., Court of Ap-
peals remanded the case back to the FERC 
on the grounds that not all available seismic 
risk data were considered by the FERC in its 
ruling. This decision concluded round C. 
Round D is still in progress at this time. 
As shown in Table 6 the initiating proposal 
is determined by the activities in round C 
which frame the alternatives as simply 
whether or not to declare the Point Con-
ception site seismically safe. Only two par-
ties, the FERC and the CPUC are currently 
active in the process, and they are consid-
ering only one attribute-the seismic risk 
at Point Conception. A final decision will 
depend upon whether the new studies show 
TABLE 6 
ELEM ENTS OF R OU ND D. 
Problem Form ulation: Is Point Conception seismically safe? 
Init iating Event : 
Alternatives: 
Interaction: 
FERC and CPuc set u p procedures to consider 
additional seismic risk data. 
Declare Poin t Conception safe: D 1 
Declare Point Conception not safe: D2 
No intera<·tion yet, as stu<ly grou ps for F t:Rl' a nd <:P UC exa mine seismic 
data in preparat ion fo r hea rings. 
Curren tly Active Parties 
FERC 
•cpuc 
Key Decisions; 
p , 
P, 
Attribute Considered 
x, 
x, 
None yet. Future hearings are to determine whether or not seismic 
risk is accep table for Point Conception. 
• Interested party with responsibility fo r decision{s). 
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this risk to be above or below some accept-
able level. 
INTERPRETATION OF THE MAMP MODEL 
The MAMP representation is designed to 
both describe a political decision process, 
and to bring structure to that description 
that might suggest institutional reforms. 
The California decision process illustrated 
in this paper can be interpreted from many 
varied perspectives. It is a good example of 
conflicting national and local interests; it is 
a study of the workings of the adversarial 
nature of U.S. regulatory proceedings; it is 
a precedent-setting report of procedural 
practice for setting energy policy; as well as 
an account of introducing a controversial 
large-scale technology with a small proba-
bility of a catastrophic accident. Clearly, a 
full exposition of these interpretations 
would go beyond the scope of this paper. In 
this spirit we will briefly present two in-
sights from this approach which are of par-
ticular interest to the IIASA Risk Group: the 
importance of sequential decision making 
and the role that risk analysis has played in 
the siting process. 
The importance of sequential decision 
making 
The sequential aspect of the LNG siting 
process in California is crucial for under-
standing the current situation. During the 
seven-year course of the process, the need 
for imported natural gas in California di-
minished greatly. Instead of examining this 
need, the interested parties, "locked in" by 
previous decisions, are now examining the 
seismic data at a rather slow pace. This is 
an example of a process of nondecision 
making where the interested parties are 
using existing political institutions and pro-
cedures to limit the scope of actions. There 
may be no incentive for anyone to rule on 
the seismicity of Point Conception if there 
is now little interest in siting on LNG ter-
minal. (For a more detailed discussion of 
the role of nondecision making in the polit-
ical process, see Bachrach and Baratz, 
1970.) 
A second example of undesirable effects 
from sequential constraints concerns the 
risk of an interruption in the supply of 
natural gas. Initially, the applicant stressed 
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supply interruption risk due to shortage of 
natural gas as a major reason for importing 
LNG to three separate sites. During the 
course of the decision process, for reasons 
beyond the control of the applicant, the 
three sites were reduced to one site, and 
the number of storage tanks at that site 
were reduced from four to two. The planned 
Point Conception throughput of 58,000 m3 
LNG/day, (equivalent in energy flow to 
roughly 15 modern nuclear reactor units), 
is large for one geographical location 
(Mandl & Lathrop, 1981). Because of this 
concentration in one small area, and the 
possibility of routine closures or nondeliv-
ery resulting from bad weather, etc., the net 
result of the sequential decision process is 
that a project originally meant to decrease 
supply interruption risk has been shaped 
over time into a project that may increase 
supply interruption risk. 
The sequential nature of the decision 
~rocedures, as clearly demonstrated by the 
increasing concreteness of the problem for-
mulations through the four rounds of dis-
cussions in California, limits the possibili-
ties for comprehensive analyses. The risk 
studies were carried out, not as an input to 
a broad energy siting analysis in California, 
but to support a more narrowly defined 
problem (Should site x or site y be ap-
proved?). Since round A in California was 
not defined in these narrow terms (the 
question of whether the terminal was 
needed was yet to be resolved), the analyses 
were ill suited to address fully the issues on 
the table. In some sense, then, analyses 
designed to address the question of safety 
were prematurely introduced into a process 
that had not resolved higher-order ques-
tions of energy policy. Though they served 
to focus the debate on the safety question, 
they could not offer (nor were they in-
tended to offer) a panacea for the resolution 
of the siting question. (It is not surprising, 
then, that round A ended in a stalemate. 
The second round, where the State Legis-
lature took center stage, narrowed the prob-
lem (by resolving the question of whether 
California needed a site) to one more recep-
tive to technical risk studies.) 
The role of risk analyses 
A great deal of attention has also been 
paid recently to the topic of technological 
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risk assessment for problems such as the 
siting of facilities (see Conrad, 1980; 
Schwing & Albers, 1980). It is of interest to 
examine the role that risk assessments have 
played in the California LNG case. 
During the course of the LNG debate in 
California, six studies assessing the safety 
risks of the proposed terminals were con-
ducted by the utility and local, state, and 
federal government agencies (for a critical 
review of these studies, see Mandl & Lath-
rop, 1981). Several studies are of particular 
interest. The applicant commissioned a 
consulting firm, Science Applications Inc. 
(SAi), to do a study and the FERG produced 
its own risk assessment. Both reports 
showed very low numbers on various prob-
abilistic measures of risk (expected fatali-
ties per year and individual probability of 
fatality per year). These numbers were in-
terpreted to mean that the risk was accept-
able. A risk assessment produced by the 
consulting firm Socio-Economic Systems 
(SES) for the Oxnard municipal government 
suggested similarly low probabilistic mea-
sures of risk (though expected fatalities 
were 380 times higher than the applicant's 
assessment), but they interpreted the fig-
ures as unacceptably high. 
One explanation lies in the format for 
presenting the results. The SAi study de-
scribed maximum credible accidents (MCAs) 
without accompanying probabilities. Op-
position groups interpreted these results as 
evidence that the terminal was not accept-
ably safe. The municipal government, orig-
inally in favor of the site, began to waver in 
its support, probably influenced by the ap-
parent uncertainty of the risk and the 
strength of the opposition groups (Ahern, 
1980). In sum, risk assessments did not 
provide a single, coherent assessment of 
acceptability of the risk of an LNG terminal; 
their results were subject to interpretation 
depending on party positions (Lathrop, 
1980). In fact, risk assessments were used 
both to promote and to oppose terminal 
applications. 
In reviewing the technical differences 
among the assessments leading to these 
conclusions, Lathrop and Linnerooth (in 
press) have shown that there are many 
degrees of freedom left to engineering and 
analytic judgment, including how to char-
acterize risk, what formats to use for pre-
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sentation, what gaps to fill with assump-
tions, which of several conflicting models to 
use, how to portray the degree of confidence 
in the results, and what contingencies sim-
ply to leave out of the analysis. 
This analytic freedom helps explain the 
differences among the above three Oxnard 
risk assessments. It can push the risk mea-
surement in any direction. Very conserva-
tive assumptions can drive it up; omissions 
of inconvenient aspects such as terrorism 
can drive it down. Clear presentations of 
expert disagreements can decrease the con-
fidence in the results, and so on. The final 
result may have as much to do with the 
predilections of the analyst as with the 
physical characteristics of the site or tech-
nology. 
This finding takes on special significance 
when viewed in the context of the policy 
process. The MAMP model has illustrated 
that the risk assessments, though intended 
to advise a client on the safety of the pro-
posed terminal, were, almost without ex-
ception, eventually used to support a party 
argument. For this reason, clear incentives 
exist for the analysts to present their results 
as persuasively as possible, which explains 
the tendency on their part to omit discus-
sions on the uncertainty of their results and 
to choose presentation formats that present 
their case as strongly as possible. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The California case study illustrates that 
political decisions are messy when there are 
grave uncertainties regarding the risks and 
benefits of proposed projects. Interested 
parties hesitate to express their opinions 
too clearly because of a fear that they can 
be used against them. The arguments they 
actually use are designed to persuade, but 
may not represent their true objectives. 
Over time the parties may change their 
positions, either because they have recon-
sidered the problem in the light of new 
information or because an exogenous event 
occurs which creates a short-run cri-
sis. These points have been alluded to in 
the recent literature on information pro-
cessing as well as in the emerging literature 
on technology and risk assessment from an 
institutional perspective. (A set of papers 
on this subject appears in Conrad, 1980, 
and Kunreuther & Ley (in press.) 
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The MAMP model should be viewed as a 
starting point for undertaking research 
which can improve the political process 
with respect to problems such as the siting 
of facilities. We have seen that formal risk 
analyses, especially risk assessments, are 
subjective exercises undertaken to support 
a specific party's arguments. Furthermore, 
the importance of these analyses will de-
pend on the nature of the sequential deci-
sion process, the relevant interested parties 
which interact, and the type of conflicts 
produced between them. Given these de-
scriptive observations, the following re-
search areas appear to be promising ave-
nues for the future. 
Establishing credibility of analyses 
In a recent paper Nelkin and Pollak 
(1979) indicate the inadequacy of existing 
institutions to deal with problems of con-
flicting evidence and polarized expert opin-
ion with respect to questions such as risk 
assessments. As a way of dealing with this 
problem, they advocate the need to estab-
lish rules of evidence as a basis for making 
better decisions. Lathrop and Linnerooth 
(in press) provide a suggested set of guide-
lines with respect to establishing rules of 
evidence. In particular, they stress the im-
portance of defining the risk being assessed, 
being clear on assumptions and error 
bounds as well as indicating the conditional 
nature of specific analyses which are un-
dertaken. 
There is a need for more field research 
which attempts to apply these criteria or 
others to a specific set of problems. One of 
the difficulties which currently exists is the 
lack of an institutional mechanism for eval-
uating the different risk assessments pro-
duced by different parties. Ackerman, 
Rosa-Ackerman, Sawyer & Henderson 
(1974) point out that the traditional ap-
proaches such as legal responses, agency 
hearings, and judicial reviews have inherent 
limitations with respect to evaluating these 
conflicting assessments. The problem is es-
pecially difficult for the siting of new tech-
nologies where there are no objective mea-
sures of risk. Private consulting firms fre-
quently undertake these analyses and have 
a built -in bias in telling the contracting 
party what they want to hear. 
We feel that the policy recommendation 
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suggested by Ackerman and co-workers, 
that one establish a review board to exam-
ine these assessments, deserves a trial for 
problems such as the LNG siting case dis-
cussed above. Under the proposed proce-
dure the members, all of whom would be 
trained in subjects fundamental to techni-
cal analysis, would provide a written report 
evaluating the impact of specific assess-
ments and specific issues (e.g., population 
risk, environmental impact). The authors 
urge that particular attention be given to 
specifying the empirical basis of the set of 
findings and how well the analysis is 
grounded in scientific theory. 
Research on facilitating collective 
action 
In a very stimulating paper, Buckley, 
Burns, and Meeker (1974) point out that 
existing institutional mechanisms and so-
cial relations among the interested parties 
significantly influence their response to a 
particular problem or issue. The MAMP 
model is an attempt to explore the type of 
interactions between the parties. The em-
phasis is, thus, on the decision process 
rather than simply on the outcomes, as in 
standard models of choice such as game 
theory, multiattribute utility theory, and 
cost-benefit analysis. 
Buckley, Burns, and Meeker point out 
that one can help resolve conflicts and pro-
mote collective decision making by better 
structuring the environment in which de-
cisions are made. For example, communi-
cation between the parties who disagree 
with each other on particular alternatives 
can be facilitated by having some type of 
mediator (e.g., a government agency) who 
hears opposing arguments as well as enforc-
ing agreements made in an earlier round. 
Future empirical research could examine 
the types of attributes one would like a 
decision process to satisfy. For example, 
one could ask, "Have each of the interested 
parties been satisfied with its role in the 
process?" "Were a wide enough set of alter-
natiyes considered so that the parties felt 
that a choice was actually being made?" 
The answers to these types of questions in 
a concrete problem context may also sug-
gest specific policy recommendations. For 
example, if all interested parties were ex-
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pected to have excess to the same type of 
information (e.g., risk assessments evalu-
ated by a review board) before evaluating 
different alternatives, then some type of 
institutional mechanism would be needed 
to achieve this objective. 
In investigating process, there should be 
a recognition that certain factors may be 
more important in some cultural settings 
and less relevant in others. The promising 
work of Thompson (1981) and Douglas and 
Wildavsky (in press) on developing ele-
ments of a cultural theory of risk suggests 
that the constellation of different groups 
(e.g., castes, sects) and the type of interac-
tion between then are important consider-
ations in specifying approaches for promot-
ing collective decision making. Nelkin and 
Pollak (1979) point out that appropriate 
procedures vary with national political 
styles. They note that the approach to solv-
ing conflicts in a political context of consen-
sus and compromise will differ from that in 
an adversary culture. 
Policy instruments 
If interested parties have conflicting 
goals and objectives, it may be possible to 
design certain policy instruments to reallo-
cate the costs and benefits so that there is 
more harmony between the groups. Two 
mechanisms that may be particularly rele-
vant in this connection are insurance 
schemes and compensation systems. 
Insurance may provide a way of protect-
ing potential victims against potential prop-
erty losses and physical injury. Today there 
is limited insurance protection against 
large-scale accidents such as a catastrophic 
accident of an LNG terminal. A General 
Accounting Office report (1978) concluded 
that under present liability arrangements 
injured parties could not be fully compen-
sated for a serious accident. Some of the 
research questions which could be appro-
priately addressed in future problem-fo-
cused studies are: 
• Which of the interested parties is liable 
in the event that a specific disaster occurs 
after a project has been sited? 
• What types of enforcement procedures 
can be evoked to assure that contract pro-
visions are satisfied ex post? 
• Are there historical lessons which shed 
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light on the role of insurance as a tool for 
providing financial protection to potential 
victims? 
With respect to the more direct conse-
quences of a siting a new facility, O'Hare 
( 1977) has proposed a compensation system 
to deal with opposition to proposed sites 
from certain interested parties. For exam-
ple, suppose residents of a community were 
concerned with suffering losses in property 
values as well as safety and environmental 
risks if the project were sited there. O'Hare 
proposes that each community determine 
a minimum level of per capita compensa-
tion for it to be willing to make a legal 
commitment to have the project in its back-
yard if the compensation is paid. 
Further research is needed on the prob-
lems of such a system working in practice 
for a particular problem. In California, no 
facility was approved in part because com-
pensation was not offered to the affected 
public who perceived themselves as losers. 
Buckley, Burns, and Meeker (1974) have 
suggested that changing the structure of 
payoffs may reduce conflicts of interest be-
tween the parties. On the other hand, it is 
not clear what type of payments would be 
necessary to appease opposition groups 
such as the Sierra Club. 
From the above suggested topics it 
should be clear that there is considerable 
research of a prescriptive nature on risk 
which needs to be undertaken. The purpose 
of our cross-country comparisons of LNG 
siting decisions is to provide considerable 
data on how the political process appears 
to work in practice and the differences 
across countries. The MAMP model de-
scribed in this paper has been found to be 
a useful framework for making comparisons 
between countries. The challenge for the 
future is to capitalize on our understanding 
of process to try and improve political de-
cision making. 
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